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This thesis examines the quality of pseudorandom number generation for cryptographic 
purposes in general and the generation of such numbers in a mobile device (Android 
phone), in particular, since we expected to find non-random properties in these. 
Initially, the need for random numbers for encryption purposes is discussed from 
a perspective of Information Warfare. Thereafter, ways of testing a bit string for random 
properties as well as some pseudorandom number generating algorithms are presented. 
This also includes the shrinking and the self-shrinking generator normally used to 
improve the random properties of the output m-sequence of linear feedback shift 
registers. A couple of possible attacks on pseudorandom number generators are also 
briefly presented. 
Finally, we generate and analyze some pseudorandom bit strings in three different 
ways using the NIST test suite, both before and after the self-shrinking generator has 
been applied to them. The strings generated by the Android phone passed the NIST test 
suite, and it is difficult to claim any improvement in random properties by applying the 
self-shrinking generator. On a bit string with poor random properties, however, the self-
shrinking generator improves randomness from the perspective of linear dependency and 
complexity, but not from the perspective of bit frequency. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
When the average man thinks about war and warfare, the first thing that comes 
into his mind might be images of traditional wars like World War II. Wars in which 
battles were fought on a distinct battleground, where man fought against man, tank 
against tack, airplane against airplane and ship against ship. Battles like these are easy to 
understand. The way to defeat your opponent is to destroy him through physical means, 
and it is easy to see who walks away from a duel a winner, and who the loser. What many 
might tend to forget is that there was a long series of events and processes leading up to 
every battle. Battles were never fought by coincidence, at least one side had knowledge 
of what was about to happen and believed it could gain from it; we typically call this 
knowledge intelligence. 
Intelligence has always played an important role in warfare. With knowledge of 
your own forces, and good and reliable intelligence regarding your opponent, you can 
choose when and where to engage with him in a battle. You also know what to expect 
from your opponent, what resources he has, the morale of his troops, his ideas, tactics and 
operational skills, his strengths and his weaknesses; in short, you know everything that 
affects his possibility to fight you. Sun Tzu said in one of his most famous quotes: “So it 
is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred 
battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do 
not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”1 
Of course, intelligence is not always easily collected. Perhaps even more importantly, as 
Clausewitz stated, it is not always easily interpreted and used.2 A military power that can 
use intelligence to its advantage, and also control the opponent’s access to intelligence, 
has a big advantage and can successfully conduct large-scale war-changing operations 
like the invasion in Normandy 1944. Through superior intelligence capabilities, the 
1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Trans. Thomas Cleary (Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 1991), 24. 
2 Carl von Clausewitz, Om Kriget, Trans. Hjalmar Mårtensson, Klaus-Richard Böhme and Alf W 




                                                 
 advantage in information available and possibilities to plant false intelligence into the 
German intelligence service, the Allied forces could deceive Hitler, thereby creating 
favorable preconditions for an amphibious landing and taking a big step towards ending a 
war that had been tormenting Europe for five years.3 
Kinetic destruction, as in World War II, still plays an important role in today’s 
warfare. But with the introduction of modern technology the possibilities for gaining 
intelligence have changed dramatically. This technology makes it possible for us to 
collect and get access to important intelligence to a greater extent than ever before. This 
also means, however, that our opponent has the same possibilities. We therefore have to 
protect our own sensitive data and information carefully. This might be more difficult 
than one would first think, since almost all information regarding our forces‒‒their 
capabilities, equipment, locations, actions and interactions‒‒could be of interest to an 
adversary. Certainly, information has become one of the cornerstones of modern warfare. 
A. INFORMATION WARFARE 
To better explain the importance of information in today’s military, the term 
Information Warfare (IW) has been introduced. One definition of Information Warfare by 
the United States Department of Defense (DoD) is as follows: 
“Information warfare includes actions taken to preserve the integrity of one’s own 
information systems from exploitation, corruption, or disruption, while at the same time 
exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary’s information systems and the process 
achieving an information advantage in the application of force.”4 
Furthermore, information warfare can be described as a structure with five pillars 
with a common foundation of intelligence. The five pillars consist of Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP), Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW), Destruction and Operational 
3 William B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler, the Normandy Deception (Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 1993). 





                                                 
 Security (OPSEC).5 These are five free standing columns, but they can often be used in 
interaction with each other. 
1. Psychological Operations 
Psychological operations are the operations to try to affect an opponent by 
influencing his emotions, reasoning and behavior. This is done through our own troops 
actively spreading information favorable to us but misleading to an adversary, reinforcing 
his misinterpretations and misleading him in his estimations about what damages he has 
caused us. PSYOP is often conducted through traditional open source media like radio, 
TV and printed news, but can also be more directed through leaflets and media 
campaigns in conflict areas. PSYOP is often directed at the adversary’s civilian 
population to try to disrupt the people’s support of their leaders or to encourage them to 
revolt.6 
2. Deception 
Deception is the military act of actively misleading an enemy, putting him in a 
situation where he believes that he has a correct image of the situation while the correct 
image really is very different. This has been done by armies throughout history; some 
have managed better and some worse. To be successful one has to perform a deception 
that gives an adversary information inputs from multiple sources, all confirming each 
other. But one also has to make sure that information revealing the true image is not 
accessible. The purpose of deception is to create a situation where the opponent is 
engaged in actions that will not interfere with ours and restrain him from taking actions 
on our movements and attacks. 
5 David L. Adamy, EW102, A Second Course in Electronic Warfare (Boston, MA: Artech House 
Publishers, 2004), 5–6. 
6 The term “Psychological Operations” have been changed to “MISO – Military Information Support 
Operations.” The older term is however still commonly used. United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 




                                                 
 3. Electronic Warfare 
Electronic Warfare is the use of the electromagnetic spectra for military success. 
It is divided into three subgroups: Electronic Attack (EA), Electronic Warfare Support 
(ES) and Electronic Protection (EP). EW includes techniques and activities such as 
analysis of the electromagnetic spectra (i.e., what frequencies are being used and for 
what), analysis of how an opponent’s wireless communication network is constructed, 
attacking weapons and sensor systems that actively or passively are used in the 
electromagnetic spectra and also protecting ourselves against similar actions and attacks. 
4. Destruction 
Destruction in this context refers to the destruction of information warfare 
capabilities. Destruction of information and intelligence, electromagnetic structures like 
radar systems, communication nodes and other means of communication. Destruction can 
be accomplished not only through kinetic energy at relatively close distance but also 
through non-kinetic energy at great distances, e.g., through cyber-attacks on computer 
networks to erase and destroy crucial data. 
5. Operational Security 
Operational security is intended to protect information about our resources, aims, 
intentions, etc., from falling into the hands of our adversary. Just as we try to get as much 
information about our opponent, he tries just as hard to get to know about us. To conduct 
successful operations with a minimum of losses we have to make sure that our opponent 
is denied this information. Maintaining a high operational security is of the utmost 
importance to achieve our goals. 
B. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION  
From what has previously been discussed it is clear that in information warfare, 
protection of information is of great importance. Looking at the five pillars of 
information warfare, at least two pillars, Deception and OPSEC, have a direct need to 




 many ways, one of which is making it non-accessible by locking it into a vault. But we 
not only want to protect information from falling in the hands of an enemy, we also want 
to share the same information within our forces and to friendly forces. Thus, we need 
ways to securely communicate information. The means of doing so is called cryptology. 
Cryptology (or cryptography, from Greek: cryptos = “hidden/secret” and –logia = 
“study” or graphein = “writing”) has been used for military purposes for a long time. 
Early encryption methods are the transposition cipher where letters are rearranged or the 
substitution cipher where every letter is represented by another letter making the message 
unreadable if you do not know the method used (the key). Some examples of these 
classical cryptology schemes are the Caesar and the Vigenère ciphers.7 Today we use 
more sophisticated methods of encryption but the basic idea is still the same; we want to 
transmit a plain text message securely by applying an encryption algorithm. When it 
comes to the message, we want to be able to transmit any plain text message without 
limitations; i.e., we do not want to have to adjust our plain text message to fit the 
encryption algorithm in any way. For the encryption algorithm itself we nowadays 
assume “Kerckhoff’s principle,” assuming that the algorithm itself is commonly known 
and cannot be used as the sole means of protecting the message.8 Since we now have two 
entities, none of which we can modify to gain protection we use a third entity to do so, 
namely the encryption key.  
7 For an excellent overview of the history and development of encryption, see Simon Singh, The Code 
Book (New York, NY: Random House 1999).  
8 Douglas R. Stinson, Cryptography Theory and Practice, 3rd ed. (Boca Raton, FL: Chapman & 










Figure 1.  Plain text and encryption key used as an input to an encryption algorithm 
resulting in an encrypted text. 
The encryption key is what the encryption algorithm uses as an initial input to 
start encrypting the plain text. One can see the key being the initial settings of a number 
of variables in a very complicated machine that for each iteration changes according to 
their previous values. All changes to the settings are deterministic and depend on their 
current value, and the plain text is entered so it is only the initial value that affects the 
changes. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the key (or the initial setting) is 
chosen in such a way that no one can guess or gain access to it. If a human would be 
given the responsibility to choose an encryption key, he would most likely choose a key 
that would be easy to remember (e.g., for decryption purposes), just like most people do 
when they choose a password for their online services. Just as passwords can be broken 
using regular dictionary lookups, password dictionary lookups,9 or trying simple 
substitution methods (like using common words but changing the letter “O” to a zero) 
encryption keys chosen by humans could be broken just as easily. To prevent this we 
choose numerical encryption keys randomly. Since a human is not good at picking 
random numbers we have to rely on machines to create random numbers or strings of 
random numbers. 
9 Online you can find dictionaries with passwords that have been broken or in other ways obtained 
through attacks on numerous databases. Any password that has ever been broken, therefore, has just as bad 













                                                 
 C. RANDOM NUMBERS 
To most people, creating random numbers might seem to be one of the easiest 
tasks there is. You do not have to think, just pick a number from among several others. 
However, on the contrary, it is extremely difficult to do so. By randomness, we normally 
mean non-predictable; i.e., among a given number of alternative outcomes (where only 
one can occur) all outcomes should have the same likeliness of happening. A person 
participating in a raffle, for example, would expect to have the same chance of winning 
the grand prize as anyone else. In a raffle, randomness is often achieved by tickets being 
mixed in a container with the winning ticket being drawn by an official. But what if the 
tickets are not properly mixed and instead are just put in a jar as they are being sold? 
What if the lottery tickets have different sizes, weights, paper quality or colors? This does 
not automatically mean that a winning ticket cannot be drawn at random, but the chances 
of the raffle official being influenced by such factors and thereby biased increases. If the 
raffle official knows ahead of time that the tickets differ and also knows which type of 
tickets belong to which participants he has a greater possibility to affect the outcome of 
the raffle. This would not elect the winner of the raffle randomly, and the lottery would 
not be considered fair.  
In the situation described in the previous paragraph, the raffle official drawing the 
winning ticket is clearly a great risk to biasing the outcome. Therefore, mechanical raffle 
and lottery machines are widely used in state arranged lotteries like the Mega Millions, 
Powerball and Lotto. Mechanical lottery machines normally just draw numbers 
identifying the winning ticket/tickets and use either gravity or air flow to pick a ball 
indicating a number in the appropriate range. Depending on the type of lottery, the drawn 
ball is either put aside or put back to make it possible to be drawn again. This is an 
illustrative way of picking numbers and given that each number is represented on one of 
the balls, all balls are of the same weight and size and are properly mixed, this is a fair 
way to pick random numbers. 
Even if mechanical machines are good from a perspective of picking random 




 applications. They are just too large and too slow, and of course do not produce a usable 
digital output. In the early days of computer programming users started to search for 
efficient ways to generate random numbers using computers. John von Neumann created 
the “middle-square” method, one of the first methods to be used. In this method a random 
number is generated by taking the previous random number, squaring it and extracting 
the middle digits of the result. Von Neumann used 10 digits, while others suggested both 
more and fewer digits.10 The problem with the “middle-number” method is that it is not a 
very good random number generator; the numbers achieved just appear to be random. 
When analyzed mathematically, it is clear that they lack important properties of random 
numbers. Furthermore the randomness of the output greatly depends on which input is 
being used. There are many examples of inputs that quite soon will “loop” and get back 
to an already used “random” number; i.e., they have a very short period. Others do, 
however, result in random numbers that pass appropriate statistical tests. 
Random numbers are today used in a number of different areas such as 
simulation, sampling, numerical analysis, computer programming and recreation. This 
thesis will focus on the generation and use of random numbers for encryption purposes. 
Since we normally use computers for encryption it is not necessary to create random 
decimal numbers; binary bit strings will do just fine. All that is needed is an electronic 
“coin tosser” creating random “heads and tails” interpreted as 1’s and 0’s, or in other 
words; something that “assigns a numerical value to the outcome of the random 
experiment.”11 To be able to implement such a feature in a computer or a mobile device 
we have to make it computable; i.e., we need an algorithm to do this for us. Such an 
algorithm will give us a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG). A PRNG is said to be 
pseudorandom since the output is not actually random; it is the result of a mathematical 
computation performed by a deterministic machine operating under given circumstances. 
A truly random number generator would not use any computations at all, thereby being 
10 Donald E. Knuth, The Art of Computer Programming, Volume 2/Seminumerical Programming, 2nd 
ed. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1981), 3–4. 
11 Alberto Leon-Garcia, Probability and Random Processes for Electrical Engineering, 2nd ed. 




                                                 
 totally unpredictable. By choosing good algorithms with proper complexity, a PRNG can 
be created whose output has the properties of being random. So even if by using a PRNG 
we compute a string of random bits, thereby making the output predictable, this string has 
(or should have) the same properties of a truly random string. The output depends on the 
input and the algorithms used. The challenge is to create a PRNG that creates bit strings 
with properties of random numbers and also does not reveal any information on the data 
used as the input creating these strings. 









 II. TESTING FOR RANDOMNESS 
Testing to see whether a bit string is random or not can be challenging since there 
are many ways in which non-randomness can appear. A string having approximately the 
same number of ones and zeroes is perhaps an obvious test for a random bit string, but 
one also has to take into consideration other aspects such as repeating patterns, length of 
runs (repeating bits), linear dependency, etc. 
A. THE NIST TEST SUITE 
The U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed a 
suite of random number generation tests. This test suite is available for download at the 
NIST homepage12 together with a thorough description on how the tests work, how they 
should be applied and how the results can be interpreted. The suite consists of 15 
different tests examining different aspects of randomness of a binary sequence. The 
purpose of these tests is to support the user in deciding whether a sequence is random or 
not. NIST does not claim that a sequence passing the tests in the suite really is random; it 
is always up to the user to interpret the test results and make that decision himself or 
herself based on the results. 
To run the tests the user needs a chosen number of generated bit strings of equal 
lengths to be tested for randomness. Each such string is to be treated as being one 
sequence in a longer file of sequences. Therefore, the test suite needs both the sequence 
length and the number of sequences to be tested as an input. No recommendations 
regarding number of sequences is given, but for the test results presented later 100 bit 
strings were used. The 15 tests in the NIST test suite are presented here and briefly 
explained13:   
12 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/rng/documentation_software.html. 
13 Andrew Rukhin et al., A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators 
for Cryptographic Application (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 






                                                 
 1. The Frequency (Monobit) Test 
This test checks the occurrence of “1” and “0” throughout the full sequence. In a 
truly random sequence we would expect about half of the bits to be 1 and the other half to 
be 0. This test checks if the test sequence diverges too far from this. The test is the most 
basic test of the fifteen. If a bit string does not pass this test, it is barely worth running the 
other tests. It can be seen as serving as a basis for all other tests in the test suite. 
2. The Frequency Test within a Block 
This tests the occurrence of 1 and 0 within blocks of the same size. In a truly 
random sequence we would expect about half of the bits in each block to be “1” and the 
other half to be “0.” This test is the same test as the previous one; it is just limited to 
blocks of a given size M. The block size M can be chosen by the user. 
3. The Runs Test 
This tests the length of runs in the full sequence. A run is defined as an unchanged 
sequence of bits bounded by differing bits. In other words, it could be described as the 
rate at which the bits alternate within the sequence. The statistical possibility of a bit 
being the same as the previous one is ½ in a truly random sequence. The chance at any 
given time of having a run of length n is (½)n.   
4. The Test for the Longest-Run-of-Ones in a Block 
This tests the length of runs of “1” in blocks of the same size M. The block size 
tested depends on the length of the total sequence and can be chosen to be one of three 
different preset sizes. Even if the test only checks for runs containing “1” an indicated 
lack of randomness of the number of runs of “1” indicates an equivalent lack of 




 5. The Binary Matrix Rank Test 
This test divides the sequence into matrices of a given size and checks these 
matrices individually for linear dependencies. To pass the test the created matrices must 
have a high level of linear independency. 
6. The Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test 
This test checks the peaks in the Discrete Fast Fourier Transform of the full 
binary sequence. Doing so makes it possible to identify frequency patterns that would 
indicate non randomness in the sequence. 
7. The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test 
The test divides the sequence into blocks and bitwise checks each block for the 
number of occurrences of pre-specified target strings. Once a target string is found, the 
test continues searching for the next string after the last bit in the string found. Any target 
string should appear equally often in all blocks. 
8. The Overlapping Template Matching Test 
This test is similar to the previous test, but once a target string is found, the test 
starts to search for the next target string on the following bit (i.e., it does not skip to the 
bit following the last one in the target string). Any target string should appear equally 
often in all blocks. 
9. Maurer’s “Universal Statistical” Test 
This test checks the number of bits between matching patterns. This gives an 
indication of how much the sequence can be compressed. If it is possible to highly 
compress a sequence, then it might be non-random. 
10. The Linear Complexity Test 
This test identifies linear dependence in a sequence; do parts of the sequence have 




 Algorithm for Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) described in Chapter IV, Section 
B of this thesis. A highly complex LSFR (long LSFR) indicates a higher level of 
randomness.  
11. The Serial Test 
The test takes a number of m-bit strings and checks the occurrence of these in the 
tested sequence. In a truly random string all different m-bit strings should occur about 
equally as often. This test is similar to the Frequency Test (1) but for strings instead of 
single bits. 
12. The Approximate Entropy Test 
This test works as the serial test (11) but instead of looking at the whole sequence 
it looks at two adjacent blocks of the sequence and compares the occurrence of strings in 
these blocks. The strings are expected to occur about the same number of times in both 
the blocks.  
13. The Cumulative Sums (Cumsums) Test 
The test counts “1” as +1 and “0” as -1. Then it checks the cumulative sum of 
strings of increasing size as it steps through the tested sequence. This test is performed 
both forward and backwards in the sequence. For the tested sequence to be considered 
random, its cumulative sums should not deviate too far from zero.  
14. The Random Excursions Test 
The test checks the value of the cumulative sum in each cycle (a cycle being the 
period between two cumulative sums being equal to zero). In how many cycles does it hit 
exactly one of eight given values? Either each sum should be hit very frequently or all 
sums should be hit just as frequently. Any deviations from this indicate non-randomness. 
15. The Random Excursions Variant Test 
This test is similar to the previous one when it checks the value of the cumulative 




 zero). Now this test instead checks how often the cumulative sum hits one of the 18 
predefined defined values. 
B. PRESENTATION OF TEST RESULTS USING THE NIST TEST SUITE 
Each test is a statistical hypothesis test in which the null hypothesis (H0) is that 
the tested bit string really is random. A test statistic is calculated from the data resulting 
from the test, and this test statistic is then used to calculate a P-value summarizing the 
test.14 The P-value indicates the probability for a truly random number generator 
generating a sequence less random than the tested one for that specific test. A low P-
value (below 0.01 in the test results later presented) means that the null hypothesis should 
be rejected; i.e., the bit string is not random. 
An example of the presented results can be seen in Figure 2. The rightmost 
column “Statistical test” states to which test the result refers. The column “Proportion” 
shows how many of the tested strings pass the test. Note that all strings do not have to 
pass a test for the whole sequence to pass. (True randomness must allow for something to 
sometimes appear nonrandom.) With the significance level set to 0.01, 1% of the strings 
can be expected to fail the test. In the result presented in Figure 2 we can see that 500 
strings have been tested and depending on which test we look at, somewhere between 
491 and 499 strings have passed the tests. 
Another way to interpret the results is to look at the distribution of the P-values. 
Columns “C1” through “C10” indicate ten subintervals of the interval 0 to 1. A P-value is 
calculated for each tested string (500 in the following example). All P-values fall within 
one of the ten subintervals and is presented accordingly. For the full sequence of strings 
to be random, the P-values should be evenly distributed; i.e., there should be about as 
many in each subinterval. A P-value of this distribution is also calculated and presented 
14 For a more thorough explanation, see Andrew Rukhin et al., A Statistical Test Suite for Random and 
Pseudorandom Number Generators for Cryptographic Application (National Institute of Standards and 






                                                 
 in the column “P-value.” Any value exceeding 0.0001 indicates the distribution can be 
considered evenly distributed.  
If a sequence of strings should not pass a test this would be indicated by an 
asterisk (*) in the “Proportion” and/or “P-value” column. As mentioned earlier, it is 
ultimately up to the user to decide whether a sequence should be considered to be random 
or not. The NIST test suite is just an aid to make that decision.  
 
Figure 2.  Example of a presentation of NIST test suite results. 
C. OTHER RANDOM NUMBER TESTS 
For the purpose of testing randomness there are a number of software packages 
available; NIST, DieHard, DieHarder, TestU01 and ENT are some commonly used. Most 
of these consist of a test suite in which each test measures a specific aspect of 
randomness in a bit string. Some tests are the same for the different software packages 
while others are unique for every test suite. It is up to each creator of the test suite to 




 III. GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS 
There are many different ways to generate random numbers, from mechanical to 
computational. Different methods also differ in result; some generate numbers with good 
random properties while others generate numbers that are not always so random. 
Depending on how they are to be used, these lesser random numbers can still be 
acceptable depending on what we want to use them for. Some methods have the sole 
purpose of generating random numbers while others are not primarily meant to be used 
for this purpose but can still be quite usable to generate random numbers that do not 
necessarily have to be cryptographic secure (e.g., for simulation purposes). 
A. CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTIONS 
A common function resulting in a string with properties of being random is the 
cryptographic hash function. It is often used for confirming that two files/texts/passwords 
are identical without comparing them character by character (e.g., for storing digital 
passwords for online services or for detecting if a text has been modified). A 
cryptographic hash function takes a clear text as an input to a standardized computation 
and outputs a fixed length, so-called digest, that appears to be random and in no way 
reveals the text used as the input.15 
The strengths of these cryptographic hash functions are that any input results in a 
fixed length output string of bits. Also, a small change in the input results in a large 
change in the output (the so called “Avalanche Effect”) it is therefore easy to generate a 
new string with other random properties. Since the result of a cryptographic hash function 
should have the properties of a random number/string it may be used as a key for an 
encryption algorithm. The problem is however that we may want longer key strings of 
pseudorandom data than a hash function alone can provide. To receive a long string of 
random numbers we instead use pseudorandom number generators.  
15 William Stallings and Lawrie Brown, Computer Security, Principles and Practice (Upper Saddle 




                                                 
 B. MODERN PSEUDORANDOM NUMBERS GENERATORS 
Encryption algorithms are, just like computers, deterministic in that sense that 
given the same input and using the same algorithms we will always receive the same 
result. The output of an encryption depends on the inputs: the clear text and the 
encryption key. Therefore, there are three variables: the plain text, the encryption key and 
the encryption algorithm. The encryption of the plain text lies in its computation through 
the encryption algorithm using a specific key. According to Kerckhoff’s principle16 the 
encryption algorithm is assumed to be commonly known, this is an assumption made for 
all encryption algorithms. This then results in the only two unknown variables being the 
plain text and the encryption key. The protection of the encrypted plain text, therefore, 
solely lies in the encryption key, and it is of utmost importance that the encryption key is 
chosen in a proper way to ensure the secrecy of the encrypted plain text. 
The best way of creating a usable encryption key is to use a random number 
generator. Since computers use binary numbers a simple coin toss with a fair coin (where 
heads result in a “1” and tails result in a “0”) would be a cryptographically good way to 
create an encryption key. However, in reality this is, of course, not practically usable 
since we want a long string of random bits, and we also want it generated quickly. Instead 
we take a random number and use this as an input to a pseudorandom number/bit 
generator which creates a longer string of bits that we can use for the encryption key. 
The pseudorandom number/bit generator is, just as the encryption algorithm, also 
a deterministic algorithm; given a certain input the same output is always achieved. 
However, with a good enough pseudorandom number/bit generator a relatively small 
input of random bits will result in a much longer output that might not be completely 
random but has most (or, hopefully, all) of the characteristics a truly random bit string 
has. If an output can be achieved where the likeliness of telling the achieved bit string 
from a truly random string is less than half the achieved bit string is as good as random 
and can be used for cryptographic purposes.  




                                                 
 There are a number of pseudorandom number/bit generators available. In general, 
they can be divided into two groups, cryptographic secure and cryptographic insecure. 
The insecure generators can still be very useful in other areas since they are often easier 
to implement and faster than the secure generators  
1. The Linear Feedback Shift Registers  
Although they are linear and thereby predictable and not considered 
cryptographically secure, LFSRs are still commonly used as pseudorandom number 
generators. The main reason for this is that they are easily implemented in hardware and 
therefore very fast to use. With an LSFR, an irreducible (or, better yet, primitive) 
polynomial17 is used to create a register. For each clock cycle the bits in the register are 
moved over one step with the bit in the last position looping back to the first position. At 
given positions in the register bit information is extracted or inserted to affect the result in 
the register. There are two main ways to construct LSFR, the Galois and the Fibonacci 
configurations. 
a. Galois LSFRs 
In this configuration, the register’s positions are numbered from the right 
to the left. It is started with a seed of all “0’s” except for one “1” (in the leftmost 
position). At each clock cycle the bits are moved over to the right, and the rightmost bit is 
looped back to the leftmost position. When this rightmost bit is looped back it is XORed 
with bits from other positions (positions given by the irreducible polynomial) affecting 
the resulting bits in other positions of the register. Every clock cycle will create a new 
register content until all possible combinations have been achieved. Using an irreducible 
polynomial ensures that no combinations are missed (except all “0’s” that will generate 
nothing else but “0’s”). 
 
 










Figure 3.  Galois Linear Feedback Shift Register (LSFR) for the generating function  
( ) 4 1f x x x= + + . 
b. Fibonacci LSFRs 
In this configuration, the register’s positions are numbered from the left to 
the right. It is started with a seed of all “0’s” except for one “1” (in the leftmost position). 
At each clock cycle the bits are moved over to the right, and the rightmost bit is looped 
back to the leftmost position. As the bits are shifted over to the right they are at given 
positions (positions given by the irreducible polynomial) extracted and XORed with the 
rightmost bit as it is being looped back to the leftmost position. Every clock cycle will 
create a new register content until all possible combinations have been achieved. Using 
an irreducible polynomial ensures that no combinations are missed (except all “0’s” that 


















Figure 4.  Fibonacci Linear Feedback Shift Register (LSFR) for the generating function  
( ) 4 1f x x x= + + . 
 
The result of the registers being run until their content is repeated can be 
presented as a list of all possible combinations of the bit positions in the registers where 
the columns represent the different numbered positions in the register, and the rows 
represent the clock cycles (see Table 1). All these columns are alike, although they are 
shifted. Any column can now be used as an m-sequence with properties of a 
pseudorandom bit string. The order of “1’s” and “0’s” in the m-sequence depends on 
which irreducible polynomial was chosen for the initial construction of the register. Since 
all possible combinations of the bits in the registers are generated there will be just as 
many “1’s” as “0’s” in the m-sequence with an exception of one zero. Since all “0’s” will 

















Iteration # Position 
 3 2 1 0 
     
1 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 1 0 
3 0 1 0 0 
4 1 0 0 0 
5 0 0 1 1 
6 0 1 1 0 
7 1 1 0 0 
8 1 0 1 1 
9 0 1 0 1 
10 1 0 1 0 
11 0 1 1 1 
12 1 1 1 0 
13 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 0 1 




Iteration # Position 
 0 1 2 3 
     
1 1 0 0 0 
2 0 0 0 1 
3 0 0 1 0 
4 0 1 0 0 
5 1 0 0 1 
6 0 0 1 1 
7 0 1 1 0 
8 1 1 0 1 
9 1 0 1 0 
10 0 1 0 1 
11 1 0 1 1 
12 0 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 0 
15 1 1 0 0 
Table 1.   List of combinations for Galois and Fibonacci LSFRs using the generating 
function ( ) 4 1f x x x= + + .Note the reverse order of the positions but how the    
m-sequences (shaded) are equal. Also note how in the Fibonacci LSFR the 
sequences at the different positions are the same, just shifted. 
 
2. The Linear Congruential Generator 
The linear congruential generator is a fast, widely used generator that is however 
insecure. It was introduced in 1949 by D. H. Lehmer and was for a long time the most 
popular random number generator.18  The generator uses two constants, a and b, within a 
defined interval, a modulus, M, and a randomly chosen seed, x. The first random number 
is achieved by multiplying the constant a by the seed x, adding the constant b and taking 
the result modulo M. 
 




                                                 
 M, a real number 
a and b, constants such that 1 , 1a b M≤ ≤ −  
x, seed such that 0 1x M≤ ≤ −   
( )1 modx a x b M= ⋅ +   
From this computation the least significant bit is used as the first random bit 
(which is the same thing as taking the result modulo 2). For the following bit the number 
of the computation in the previous step is used instead of the seed. This process is 
repeated until required number of bits has been achieved. 
 ( )1 modi ix a x b M+= ⋅ +   
Further limitations for the generator are that the seed should be a bit string of 
length no longer than length k and no pseudo random bit strings longer than length l 
should be generated where k and l are defined as follows: 
 21 logk M= +      
 1 1 1k M+ ≤ ≤ −   
The resulting generator is then called a (k,l)-linear congruential generator 
The linear congruential generator is not considered secure enough and should be 
avoided for cryptographic purposes since it can be predictable.19 Since it is easy to 
compute and implement and also very fast, though, it is widely usable in other areas 
where security is of lesser importance (e.g., games, simulations, etc.). The linear 
congruential generator repeats itself (i.e., it is periodic) after a certain number of 
iterations, and some seeds result in a shorter repetition period than others. 
 
19 Wade Trappe and Lawrence C. Washington, Introduction to Cryptography with Coding Theory, 2nd 




                                                 
 3. The Blum-Blum-Shub Generator 
The Blum-Blum-Shub20 (BBS) secure pseudorandom bit generator (PRGB) is one 
of the most popular and widely used secure PRBGs. Named after Lenore Blum, Manuel 
Blum and Michael Shub, it is sometimes also referred to as the quadratic residue 
generator.21 The base for the BBS is two large primes, p and q, that both are congruent to 
3 modulo 4 and a randomly chosen number, x, which is relatively prime to the product n 
of the two primes. This random number is used to generate a seed to the generator by 
squaring it and taking the result modulo n. 
( ) ( ), 3 mod 4 ,    and  are large primesp q p q≡   
n p q= ⋅   
,  realatively prime to x n   
2
0 mod ,  generates as seedx x n=   
Pseudorandom bits are then generated by taking the square of the seed modulo n 
and using the least significant bit (which is the same thing as taking the result modulo 2). 
For the following bit the resulting number of the computation in the previous step is used 
instead of the seed. This process is repeated until required number of bits has been 
achieved. 
( )2 1 mod mod 2i ix x n−=   
The BBS generator is considered to be a generator secure for cryptographic 
purposes. Compared to other generators it is, however, slow since it uses complex 
calculations with large numbers. Its security is based on the Composite Quadratic 
Residues problem.22 
20 Leonore Blum, Manuel Blum and Michael Shub, “A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-Random 
Number Generator,” SIAM Journal on Computing, 15 (May. 1986) 364–383.  
21 Trappe and Washington, Introduction to Cryptography with Coding Theory, 42.   




                                                 
 4. Other Generators 
There are a number of other pseudorandom number/bit generators available. Two 
examples of generators considered to be secure for cryptographic purposes are the RSA 
pseudorandom bit generator23 and the Micali-Schnorr pseudorandom bit generator.24 The 
ANSI X9.17 pseudorandom bit generator25 and the FIPS 186 pseudorandom number 
generator for DSA private keys26 are considered insecure for cryptographic purposes but 
are still useful for many other areas, such as simulation, gaming, etc. 
C. IMPROVING RANDOMNESS IN SEQUENCES 
As previously mentioned, not all ways of generating random numbers are good 
enough. There are, however, ideas for improving the randomness of the output from a 
pseudorandom number generator using different types of techniques. Two such 
techniques are the shrinking and the self-shrinking generator. These are normally used in 
combination with linear feedback shift registers, but we will later apply the self-shrinking 
generator on some strings of other, pseudorandomly, generated bit strings. 
1. The Shrinking Generator 
The concept of the shrinking generator was first published in 1993 by 
Coppersmith, Krawczyk and Mansour.27 The main idea is to run two LSFRs (R1 and R2) 
in parallel using the same clock so that their outputs are generated at the same time. The 
two LSFRs are however using different irreducible polynomials28 in their construction 
and therefore generate outputs independent from each other. If at any clock cycle the 
output bit from LSFR R1 is a “1,” the corresponding output bit from LSFR R2 is used as 
23 Alfred J. Menezes, Paul C. Van Oorschot and Scott A. Vanstone, Handbook of Applied 
Cryptography (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1997), 185–186. 
24 Ibid. 
25Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 173–175. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Don Coppersmith, Hugo Krawczyk and Yishay Mansour, “The Shrinking Generator,” Advances in 
Cryptology - CRYPTO ‘93 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Vol. 773), Santa Barbara, CA: 
Springer 1993), 22–39.  




                                                 
 an output of the shrinking generator. If the output bit from LSFR R1 instead is a “0,” the 
corresponding output bit from LSFR R2 is discarded and not used as an output of the 
shrinking generator.29 A simpler, but maybe not so random way, to achieve this is to 
create a random string of “1’s” and “0’s” and use this as a template. When this template 
is used as an overlay to an output of a LSFR (or any string) every bit in the generated 
string corresponding to the position of a “1” in the template is used as an output from the 
shrinking generator while bits corresponding to the positions of the “0’s” are discarded. 
The result of the shrinking generator will be a string shrunken to about half its 
original length since half of the output bits from the LSFR R1 are “1’s” and the other half 
are “0’s” (or actually one more “1” than “0’s”30). The properties of the resulting output 
from the shrinking generator might however be different since any patterns or statistical 













LSFR R1:  1101000110010111011001101100110111010111 
LSFR R2:  0110100101101001011010010110100101101001 
Output:      10   0   1  00  0    1  11  0    0  10  1    1  10  0    1 
 
Figure 5.  The shrinking generator and an example of an output. 
29 Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 211–212. 
30 See Linear Feedback Shift Registers in Chapter III, Section B. 1. 
LSFR R1 
LSFR R2 








                                                 
 2. The Self-shrinking Generator 
Closely related to the shrinking generator is the self-shrinking generator. The 
latter differs from the first in the way that it uses only one LSFR instead of two. 
However, it still results in an output depending on the positions of the “1’s” in the string. 
In the self-shrinking generator the input string is being partitioned into pairs of 
bits. These pairs will then be one of the following combinations: “00,” “01,” “10” or 
“11.” If the first bit in these pairs is a “1” the second bit will be used as an output of the 
generator. On the other hand, if the first bit is a “0” the second bit will be discarded.31 All 
the first bits are used in the decision-making only and will be discarded. If an LSFR is 
used as an input to the self-shrinking generator the likeliness of the four bit combinations 
is equal since “1’s” and “0’s” appear at the same rate in the output of the LSFR. The 







LSFR:  11 01 00 01 10 01 01 11 01 10 01 10 11 00 11 01 11 01 
Output:  1                  0             1        0        0   1        1        1  
        
Figure 6.  The self-shrinking generator and an example of an output. 
 
31 Menezes, et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 221. 
LSFR 









                                                 
 D. ENTROPY 
As mentioned above, all pseudorandom number generators need an input, or a 
seed, to start generating numbers. If this input is not chosen at random the whole 
sequence generated is also not random, since any pseudorandom number generator is 
deterministic. If the input is known (or can be guessed) the output will also be known 
(i.e., the generated bit string lacks random properties). Therefore, it is important to use 
truly random numbers as input. This is done through the use of entropy. 
Entropy can be defined as a level of uncertainty of predicting a value or as NIST 
states: “Entropy is defined relative to one’s knowledge of X prior to an observation and 
reflects the uncertainty associated with predicting its value‒‒the larger the entropy, the 
greater the uncertainty in predicting the value of an observation.”32 We therefore need a 
source that can take a number of different states; these states can then be discretized and 
used as a random input. If the number of possible states is low we will receive very low 
entropy. The same goes if the likeliness of the source taking a certain state differs a lot 
from the other states; then the entropy will also be low. One can compare it to a raffle 
with numbered tickets in it. If there are only a five tickets in it one is more likely to 
predict which ticket will be drawn than if there are 500 tickets (i.e., the entropy is higher 
with more tickets). In a similar way; if there were 500 tickets in a raffle but 250 of them 
had the same number one would be more likely to be able to predict the winning number 
(i.e., the entropy decreases if the probabilities for the outcomes are not equal). The 
recommendations on an entropy source according to NIST are as follows:33 
To create an entropy source we need first and foremost a noise source. The reason 
for utilizing noise is that it is often the only truly non-deterministic source we have 
available. The noise can be achieved from a number of different sources such as capacitor 
discharging time, time differences between key strokes and mouse movements. In mobile 
devices sources like the camera lens, the accelerometer and radio signal strength could be 
32 Elaine Barker and John Kelsey, Recommendation for the Entropy Sources Used for Random Bit 
Generation (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) DRAFT Special Publication 800–





                                                 
 used. The noise source then needs to be digitalized to be of any use in a computational 
algorithm, but this is often easily done. 
After the noise source has been digitalized one can choose to apply a conditioning 
component. This component helps to avoid the output being biased and increases the 
entropy rate. The use of this conditioning component is not required but might be needed 
depending on the noise source and its characteristics. For further discussions regarding 
the conditioning component, please read the NIST special publication.34 
The last important part of an entropy source is health testing. We trust the entropy 
source to give us random output, but we still have to check that it is working the way it is 
supposed to. Therefore, a health test on the entropy source must be performed. These 
tests can be performed as startup tests, continuous tests and on-demand tests and should 
not only check the noise source itself but also the digitalization and the conditioning 
component (if applicable). Since we put so much trust in the entropy source we have to 
be able to detect any deviations, biases or malfunctions as soon as possible and with high 
probability. Health tests can also help us identify common failure modes and make it 
possible to correct for these using, for example, a conditioning component. 
So, if we now have an entropy source that supplies us with as pure random 
numbers as possible, why do we bother using pseudorandom number generators? Why 
not use the output of the entropy source? The answer is quite simply time. While an 
entropy source requires quite some time to collect a usable amount of data a 
pseudorandom number generator can generate the same amount much faster. As 
previously mentioned, however, it requires a truly random input, or seed, to generate a bit 
string that has properties that are random enough. 
 
 




                                                 





 IV. ATTACKS  
As soon as a new encryption method is presented it is seen as a challenge to find 
feasible attacks on it. The same goes for bit strings generated by pseudorandom number 
generators. With an attack we mean to find a way to predict the output of the generator. It 
is also important to understand that the definition of an attack being successful is not 
necessarily that it is easy to predict an outcome but that the outcome can be predicted 
with higher probability than someone would need just by guessing. Strictly speaking, a 
lottery with 100 tickets ranging from the numbers 1 through 100 can be considered 
successfully attacked if we can show that no three-digit number can be drawn as the 
winning number, even if there then are 99 possible winning numbers left. Some possible 
attacks on pseudorandom number generators are presented here. 
A. ATTACKS ON SHRINKING AND SELF-SHRINKING GENERATORS 
A number of attacks have been developed on both the shrinking and the self-
shrinking generator. Two of them are presented in the following sections. Others have 
been developed through the work of Kitae Jong35 et al., Simon R. Blackburn36 and Bin 
Zhang and Dengguo Feng37 just to mention some. 
1. Attack on Short Sequence Linear Feedback Registers Using the Self-
Shrinking Generator 
This attack uses the knowledge that the original (unknown) bit string is grouped 
into pairs of two bits; this is then compared to the output bit string (known). As 
mentioned in the discussion regarding the self-shrinking generator38 we have four 
35 Kitae Jeong et al., “Improved Fast Correlation Attack on the Shrinking and Self-shrinking 
Generators,” Progress in Cryptology - VIETCRYPT 2006 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), 
Vol. 4341), (Hanoi, Vietnam: Springer, 2006), 260–270. 
36 Simon R. Blackburn, “The Linear Complexity of the Self-Shrinking Generator,” IEEE Trans. Inf. 
Theory, 45 (September 1999), 2073–2077. 
37 Bin Zang and Denggou Feng, “New Guess-and-Determine Attack on the Self-Shrinking Generator,” 
Advances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2006 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS), Vol. 4284), 
(Shanghai, China, Springer: 2006), 54–68. 




                                                 
 alternatives for each pair: 00, 01, 10, 11, each approximately just as possibly likely. 
When we know the first output bit, say 1, we also know that the first two bits for sure are 
not 10 (which would have given 0 as the first output bit). Furthermore we know that the 
probability for the very first bit to be 0 is equal to the probability for it to be 1. This 
combined leads us to the conclusion for the following probabilities for the first two bits: 
p(00) = ¼ , p(01) = ¼, p(10) = 0, p(11) = ½. This is then repeated for all pairs of bits and 
we can thereby assume an original bit string with higher probability than by just 
guessing.39 
2. The Backtracking Algorithm 
Another attack on LSFRs is the Backtracking Algorithm.40 This algorithm 
requires that the feedback polynomial of the LSFR is known. It is based on an attack on 
the shrinking generator where the inner state of LSFR R2 is guessed and used to create 
the R2 sequence. Through this single bits of the R1-sequence can be reconstructed which 
all gives a linear equation. When enough bits have been recreated we can solve the linear 
equations and find the inner state of R1. This can then be double checked by running the 
two LSFRs and checking the output using the shrinking generator. A similar method can 
be applied to the self-shrinking generator. Now, however, since all even bits serve as the 
equivalent of the R2-sequence in the case with the shrinking generator and they are not 
the complete output of an LSFR, they are not necessarily linearly dependent (i.e., they 
have to be guessed bit by bit). This makes the attack on the self-shrinking generator more 
complicated and not so straightforward. 
B. OTHER ATTACKS 
There are also attacks that focus not on a specific algorithm or method but instead 
work directly with the string of random bits. One such powerful, and quite fascinating 
39 Erik Zenner, Matthias Krause, Stefan Lucks, “Improved Cryptanalysis of the Self-Shrinking 
Generator,” Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP) 2001 (Lecture Notes in 





                                                 
 algorithm, is the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm that finds a linear dependence in a string 
of apparently random bits. 
1. The Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm 
A string of “0’s” and “1’s” placed “randomly” may seem very random indeed. 
However, there is always a function that will express a linear dependency between the 
bits in any given string, even the truly random ones. In “poor” random strings such a 
function can easily be created to predict/compute the next bit. In a really poor random 
sting this equation is very simple; in not so poor random strings it is a bit more 
complicated. Such a function can also be created for the really good random strings. 
However, in the cases of the really good random strings, the equation needs the input of 
all the previous bits in the strings to predict/compute the very last bit.  
The algorithm to create these “predicting functions” is called the “Berlekamp-
Massey algorithm.”41 Given a binary output sequence, the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm 
is used to find the simplest linear feedback shift register that creates this very same 
sequence. This algorithm walks through the binary string bit by bit, adding complexity to 
the function when needed to create the target bit string. An example of how it can be 
applied is presented as follows:42 
Assume the bit string zn of length 20 is observed; zn = 11010110010001111010. It 
is very difficult to intuitively say whether or not the bits in this string have a linear 
dependency, but we will see that they are indeed linearly dependent and in a not too 
complex way. For the computations in the algorithm we need to keep track of a number 
of variables: 
 N   The current index, or the number of bits “taken into operation”  
 NL    The complexity at a given index N 
 m   The largest index such that m NL L<   
41 Menezes et al., Handbook of Applied Cryptography, 200–202. 




                                                 
  ( )Nf x  The current function used 
For every step in the algorithm the function ( )Nf x  is kept unchanged unless it no 
longer gives a correct result for the last bit. When ( )Nf x  must be recomputed the 
complexity NL  also must be recomputed and used as an input. The new complexity and 
function are computed using the following formulas for 1NL +  and ( )1Nf x+ : 
 ( )( )1 max , 1N N NL L N L+ = + −   
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 N N N mL L L N m LN N mf x x f x x f x+ +− − + −+ = ⋅ + ⋅   
To initiate the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm the first step is to at index 0N =  
setting the complexity to 0 ( 0 0L = ) and the function to 1 ( ( )0 1f x = ). Thereafter at index 
1N =  computing the complexity and setting the function to be 1x + , ( ( )1 1f x x= + ): 
 0N =    z =∅    0 0L =    
 ( )0 1f x =  
 1N =    1z =    ( ) ( )0 0 0max ,1 max 0,1 1L L L= − = =    
( )1 1f x x= +  
We will now try to find a function ( )f x  that generates all the following bits. In 
this function we want terms to solve the binary equation ( ) 0f x =  where the powers of x 
indicates the indexes of the last bits in the string, e.g., in the string 110010, 4 0x =  3 1x =
2 0x = 1 0x = 0 1x = . (Note that index 0 represents the term 0x , in the functions that 






 In the next step the existing function ( )1f x  still works since 11z =  and
( )1 1 1 0f x = + = . The function and the complexity remain unchanged; ( ) ( )2 1f x f x=  and 
2 1L L=  : 
 2N =    11z =    2 1L =    
( )2 1f x x= +  
 
In the third step the function ( )2f x  is no longer applicable since 110z =  but 
( )2 0 1 1 0f x = + = ≠ . We recompute the complexity 3L  and compute a new function 
( )3f x  by applying the formula as described above: 
 3N =    110z =   ( ) ( )3 2 2max ,3 max 1,2 2L L L= − = =    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 23 2 1 1 1 1f x x f x x f x x x x x x− − + −= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + + ⋅ = + +  
Double checking the function ( )3f x  above on z gives the result: 
2 1 0 1 1 0x x+ + = + + =  so it is OK. 
 
In the fourth step, the previous function works since 1101z =  and 
( )3 1 0 1 0f x = + + = . The index N is increased while the complexity, and the function 
remains unchanged; 4 3L L=  and ( ) ( )4 3f x f x= : 
 4N =    1101z =   4 2L =    





 In the fifth step we have 11010z =  but ( )4 0 1 0 0f x = + + ≠  so we have to re-
compute the complexity 5L  and the function ( )5f x : 
 5N =    11010z =   ( ) ( )5 4 4max ,5 max 2,3 3L L L= − = =    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 2 3 4 2 1 1 2 0
5 4 2
3 2 3 2 3 2
1 1
         1 2 1 1
f x x f x x f x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
− − + −= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + − + ⋅ + =
= + + + + = + + + = + +
 
 
In the sixth step we have 110101z =  and ( )5 1 0 0 1 0f x = + + = ≠ , Again, the 
index N is increased and both complexity 6L  and the function ( )6f x  are recomputed: 
 6N =    110101z =   ( ) ( )6 5 5max ,6 max 3,3 3L L L= − = =    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
3 3 3 5 4 2 0 3 2 0 2
6 5 4
3 2 2 3 2 3
1 1
         1 1 2 2
f x x f x x f x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
− − + −= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + − + ⋅ + + =
= + + + + + = + + + = +
 
 
In the seventh step, 1101011z =  but ( )6 1 0 1 0f x = + = ≠ . Once again we increase 
index N and recompute the complexity 7L  and the function ( )7f x : 
 7N =    1101011z =    ( ) ( )7 6 6max ,7 max 3,4 4L L L= − = =   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
4 3 4 6 4 2 1 3 0 2
7 6 4
4 2 2 4 2 4
1
         1 2 1 1
f x x f x x f x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
− − + −= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + + ⋅ + + =







 In the eighth step, 11010110z =  while ( )7 0 0 1 1 0f x = + + = ≠ . Yet again we 
increase the index N and recompute the complexity 8L  and the function ( )8f x : 
 8N =    11010110z =    ( ) ( )8 7 7max ,8 max 4,4 4L L L= − = =   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
4 4 4 7 6 3 0 4 0 3
8 7 6
4 3 4 3 4 3
1
         1 2 1 1
f x x f x x f x x x x x x x
x x x x x x x x x
− − + −= ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅ + + + ⋅ + =
= + + + + = + + + = + +
 
In the ninth step, 110101100z =  and ( )8 1 0 1 0f x = + + = , so the function works 
and ( ) ( )9 8f x f x=  . 
In the tenth step, 1101011001z =  and ( )9 1 0 1 0f x = + + = , so the function works 
and ( ) ( )10 9f x f x= . 
As a matter of fact, we have now found the function that works for the complete 
observed bit string. Therefore, no further computation is necessary for either the 
complexity NL  or the function ( )Nf x . Remaining bit values can be controlled with the 
function achieved: 
 
N z ( ) 4 3 1f x x x= + +  
9 110101100 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 
10 1101011001 1 + 0 + 1 = 0 
11 11010110010 0 + 1 + 1 = 0 
12 110101100100 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 
13 1101011001000 0 + 0 + 0 = 0 
14 11010110010001 1 + 0 + 1 = 0 
15 110101100100011 1 + 1 + 0 = 0 
16 1101011001000111 1 + 1 + 0 = 0 
17 11010110010001111 1 + 1 + 0 = 0 
18 110101100100011110 0 + 1 + 1 = 0 
19 1101011001000111101 1 + 0 + 1 = 0 
20 11010110010001111010 0 + 1 + 1 = 0 
 









 V. TEST RESULTS 
For the tests a number of bit strings have been used. Time constraints and 
difficulties getting access to usable data have made it challenging to get all tests done in 
time, and a more thorough examination could be done in the future. The tests performed, 
however, show some interesting results. 
A. PERFORMANCE OF THE TESTS 
The string of pseudorandom bits was run through the NIST test suite. Since the 
test suite requires multiple strings to get usable statistics the strings used were divided by 
the NIST test program into a number of equally long bit streams. Hereafter the term “bit 
string” will be used for the original pseudorandom generated string used as the general 
input for the NIST test suite, while the term “bit stream” will be used for the input to the 
NIST subtests. The bit streams created were then run through all the tests in the test suite, 
and the result was saved. The original bit string was then modified by running it through 
a self-shrinking generator.43 The resulting string was then run through the same NIST 
tests again. It is important to notice that this new bit string was now shorter than the 
original (the SSG is expected to shorten a truly random string to one fourth of its original 
length). To get comparable results the new bit string was divided into the same number of 
bit streams that were used in the original test. The new bit streams were therefore shorter 
than the originals, but they reflected the information retrieved from the full length bit 
streams in the original bit string since they were created using them as input. The results 
after having run the NIST test suite on the string after having applied the self-shrinking 
generator was compared to how the original, non-modified, bit string performed on the 
NIST test suite. Depending on which original source was being used, the NIST bit stream 
length and the number of bit streams tested varied.  




                                                 
 B. TESTING A STRING GENERATED BY AN ANDROID PHONE 
Since not as much work has been put into pseudorandom number generators for 
mobile devices as it has for their stationary equivalents, it was expected that some non-
random properties would be discovered. The intention was then to improve the 
randomness of the generated bit string by applying the self-shrinking generator (SSG). 
Generating bit strings on an Android phone was outside the scope of this thesis, and 
access to such strings turned out to be more limited than expected. Further data could 
therefore render more information. It was not until very late in the research that the bit 
strings needed were made available, and the time available for tests was very limited. 
Some tests should be run again with other parameters to see if the results could be 
affected. 
For these tests (which are described in Chapter II), two strings of random bits 
generated on an Android phone were used.44 One was created using the /dev/urandom 
block device (hereafter referred to as string A) while the other one came from the 
SecureRandom function provided by Java (hereafter referred to as string B). They were 
presented in a pure binary file and were therefore converted45 to an ASCII representation 
so that they could be modified using the SSG script. The conversion script also cut the 
file to a manageable length since the NIST test suite would not accept a too great input.46 
For the tests, 100 bit streams of length 106 were used from each string. 
1. Results before Applying the SSG 
NIST recommendations require a 96% pass rate for the bit streams, and this was 
fulfilled for string A, even if not all bit streams passed all subtests. String B passed all 
tests with one exception. In Test #7, “The Non-overlapping Template Matching Test,” for 
one of the 148 templates tested only 95 of 100 bit streams passed resulting in a 95% pass 
rate. However, this must be considered such a rare event that no conclusions of the 
44 The strings were made available through another research project. 
45 See python script for binary to ASCII conversion in Appendix C. 




                                                 
 original bit string being non-random can be drawn. Both strings must therefore be 
considered as fulfilling the NIST recommendations for required randomness. Since non-
random properties were expected, this was a bit of a disappointment. The SSG was 
applied anyway to see if the pass rate could be improved further. 
2. Results after Applying the SSG 
After the SSG had been applied, the bit strings A and B were run through the 
NIST test suite again. This time, both bit strings passed all the tests. The SSG can then at 
least be considered to have improved the result regarding one matching template in string 
B. It is however doubtful whether there was an overall improvement. The pass rate did 
improve for some tests, but it remained constant or even deteriorated for others. The 
changes in pass rate were so low that no conclusions could be drawn from this test. 
C. TESTING A STRING GENERATED BY LINUX  
As a reference a pseudorandom bit string generated by the /dev/urandom function 
in Linux (hereafter referred to as string C). The /dev/urandom function was chosen in an 
attempt to generate a string that lacked some random properties. The /dev/random 
function could have been used, but it was expected to perform better in the tests. String C 
was also converted to ASCII representation before being run through the NIST test suite 
and the SSG. In this test we used 300 bit streams of length 106. The original string was 
not as long as the Android strings, and after having applied the SSG, the bit stream length 
had to be shortened to 2.5·105 to still be able to test 300 bit streams. The original string C 
performed equally well as the Android bit strings and passed all tests with an equivalent 
pass rate.  
A divergent result was achieved when the bit string was tested after the SSG had 
been applied. The string now passed all tests with an acceptable pass rate. However, it 
failed to pass Test #9 from the perspective of an even distribution of P-values. It seems 
like the test requirements for input variables were not met. This problem has not been 
detected with any other string. Why the requirements were not met with this string in this 




 D. TESTING A STRING WITH POOR RANDOM PROPERTIES 
As a reference, a string of “really poor” bits was tested. Even if it is easy to find 
or create a string with really poor random properties (e.g., all “1’s” or a repetitive pattern 
of a given length) it remains difficult to find a string of bits with some random properties 
but still not random enough to be anywhere near to pass the NIST test suite. To create 
such a string, we used the U.S. Constitution with its 27 amendments.47  
1. Creating a Bit String with Poor Random Properties 
The string to be tested was created by letting the characters and spaces of the 
Constitution be represented by their 8-bit ASCII representation while all line breaks were 
removed. The result was an approximately 350 000 bit long string. This string now had 
some random properties while it lacked others. It, for example, passed the linear 
complexity test. This is not surprising since the Berlekamp-Massey algorithm48 has 
shown us how the full length of a string has to be taken into account to compute the linear 
complexity. Since the characters constantly change in a text, this change affects the 
complexity. The string created, however, did not pass the most basic test, the frequency 
test. This is what could be expected. Letters A-Z are represented by 01000001–01011010 
and a-z by 01100001–01111010, (i.e., bit #3 is always is a “0” for majuscule (capital) 
letters and a “1” for all minuscule letters). Since there are many more minuscule than 
majuscule letters in a regular text this will result in a higher frequency of “1’s” than “0’s” 
in the created string. Furthermore, in a regular text the letter “o” (ASCII: 01101111, 6 
“1’s” 2 “0’s”) occurs more often than the letter “b” (ASCII: 01100010, 3 “1’s” 5 “0’s”) 
resulting in a bias towards a higher frequency of “0’s.”49 These are just two examples of 
what affects bit frequency in a string derived from a text. Since all characters are 
represented by eight bits and they all start with a zero, the NIST tests will notice this as 
in, for example, “The Binary Matrix Rank Test” (Test #6) where smaller matrices created 
47 Available at: www.usConstitution.net/const.txt. 
48 See Chapter IV, Section B.1. 





                                                 
 by the string are tested for the linear dependence. Furthermore, in a string of this size you 
would expect to find some long runs of “1’s” and “0’s.” But since the character 
represented by all “0’s” is the “NUL” and the character represented with all “1’s” is “ÿ” 
(both being extremely rare in most texts, especially in the U.S. Constitution) there will 
certainly be no run longer than 14 (2·[8–1]) bits. 
2. Test Results 
For testing the string described in the previous paragraph, it was split into 10 bit 
streams, each of length 35 000 bits. In another test 100 bit streams of length 3 500 bits 
were also tested, but these bit streams seemed too short to result in any interesting results. 
When being run through the NIST test suite, the bit string created, as expected, did not 
pass the NIST test for randomness.50 Even after the self-shrinking generator was applied 
the bit string did not pass the test suite. It is r interesting, though, to see what 
improvements were made and why.  
Since the string did not pass the frequency test we could not expect it to pass after 
the SSG had been applied. That is because the relative frequency generally is maintained 
by the SSG. This also affects the result in the tests directly based on the frequency of bits 
(Tests #2 through #5) and makes the string fail those tests as well. However, by applying 
the SSG we seem to have improved the result for Test #6, “The Binary Matrix Test.” By 
applying the SSG we have to a great extent eliminated the property of the original string 
where every character was represented by eight bits. Since characters A-Z in ASCII 
representation all start with 0100 or 0101, all bits from the first half of the ASCII 
representation are being discarded. For the characters a-z (starting with 0110 or 0111) 
however, the second pair of bits results in on bit (1 or 0) in the resulting string. Thus, a 
minuscule character will always contribute to one bit more than its majuscule equivalent. 
From the second half of the ASCII representation (bits #5 through #8) varying numbers 
of bits are maintained. After having applied the SSG no pattern revealing the original 8-
50 We can now say, therefore, that we have proven that the U.S. Constitution was not written at 




                                                 
 bit “partition” can be seen. The characters have instead resulted in 0–3 bits in the new bit 
string. 
By breaking up the 8-bit “partition” we have also made it more difficult for 
“Template Matching Tests” to find non-randomness (i.e., it is more difficult to find these 
matching templates once we have substituted every 8-bit character representation with 0–
3 bits). All the bit streams of the new string did not pass all matching templates tests, and 
the string as such did not pass the test in full. Even so, we can observe a 500% 
improvement for the string in passing the subtests after the SSG was applied as compared 
to before. 
The original string did pass Test #10, “The Linear Complexity Test.” An 
improvement of the distribution of the p-values can also be seen. This can be seen as a 
result of the SSG “removing” the 8-bit partition of the original string. A string that has 





 VI. CONLUSIONS 
It was expected that pseudorandom bits strings generated on an Android phone 
would lack some random properties. An attempt would then be made to improve these 
flaws in randomness by applying the self-shrinking generator (SSG).  
A. TESTED STRINGS 
Tests using the NIST test suite (described in Chapter II) showed that the bit 
strings generated on the Android phone passed the NIST tests with a pass rate according 
to NIST recommendations. Applying the SSG affects the test results, but no conclusions 
can be made whether it is for better or for worse.  
The test performance of the Android-generated strings was compared to the 
performance of a Linux-generated string. They performed equally well, and no obvious 
differences could be identified. 
Tests were also run on a string with poor random properties, a plain text in ASCII 
representation. This string drastically failed all tests except the linear complexity test. 
After having applied the SSG, this string showed improved results in four of the tests: the 
“Binary Matrix Rank Test,” “Discrete Fourier Transform (Spectral) Test,” “Non-
overlapping Matching Template Test” and “Overlapping Template Test.” It also still 
passed the “Linear Complexity Test.” 
B. TEST ALGORITHM AND THE SELF-SHRINKING GENERATOR 
After having run the NIST test suite, before and after the SSG had been applied, 
on a bit string with poor random properties, such as the plain text string, it was clear that 
there are two main aspects of random properties that are being tested by the NIST test 
suite: frequency and linear dependency. 
In a string with good random properties the frequency of 1’s and 0’s should be 
about equal. This is not necessarily true in a string with poor random properties, and 




 The character frequency in English combined with the binary ASCII representation of the 
characters results in a string having the ratio 45/55 of 1’s and 0’s. Since the SSG 
compresses the original string with guidance on the occurrence of 1’s as the first bits in a 
pair of bits, the probability for the second bit in these pairs being a 1 or a 0 will be 
reflected in the new string created. Therefore, the ratio of the frequency of 1’s and 0’s in 
the resulting string is not 50/50, it has after the SSG was applied actually changed to a 
ratio of 38/62. This change in ratio occurs since the bit combination “10” (resulting in a 
single 0 in the SSG output string) is more common than the bit combination “11” 
(resulting in a single 1). The reason for this is that minuscules (lower case letters) are in 
majority in a text, and the majority, and the most frequently used, of the minuscules (a-o) 
are represented by “10” as bits 3 and 4, resulting in a single 0 in the SSG output string. 
The SSG is therefore for no much use when trying to improve test results from tests that 
are based on an analysis of the frequency of bits. 
A string with good random properties is expected to have a great level of linear 
independency. A string created from a binary ASCII representation of a text will at every 
eighth bit start representing a new letter. This is a pattern, or a linear dependency, that 
will easily be detected in a test. The easiest way to understand this is to realize that the 
most frequently used characters used in a text are the letters A-z. The binary ASCII 
representation of these letters all start with the bits “01,” i.e., two out of eight bits for 
every character can be predicted. This creates an obvious linear dependency in longer bit 
strings. Applying the SSG removes the two initial bits in the binary ASCII representation 
of all letters. It also affects the following bits resulting in an output of 0–3 bits for every 
8-bit representation of a letter. After the SSG has been applied to a string, its test results 
in the NIST test suite dramatically improves for tests based on linear dependence and 
spectral tests, except for the linear complexity test where already the original string 
performs well. The reason for this being that in this test the full length of the string is 
being analyzed instead of for example the “Binary Rank Matrix Test” where only blocks 
of the string are being tested. Applying the SSG on a string can therefore improve 




 C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
Time constraints made it difficult to perform as many tests under varied input 
condition as would have been desirable. A more thorough testing and analysis of test 
results, before and after having applied the self-shrinking generator could therefore be 
recommended to confirm the results presented here. More strings with limited random 
properties of various degrees could also be examined to better identify the self-shrinking 
generator’s capability of improving randomness in a string. Furthermore, more research 
could be focused on the mathematics behind how the self-shrinking generator affects a 
string. This thesis inly notes that it affects the randomness of the string, not so much why. 
When it comes to the generator used, this thesis only examines the self-shrinking 
generator. The shrinking generator is presented but due to time constraints not examined. 
A drawback with the self-shrinking generator is that it shortens the input string to approx. 
25% of its original length while the shrinking generator shortens it to only approx. 50%. 
The drawback with the shrinking generator is that it needs two inputs, a string to be 
shrunken, and a string to use as a template for performing this shrinking. There could 
however be an improved self-shrinking generator, which for example does not pair the 
bits in the input string as the existing self-shrinking generator does but instead uses every 
bit as a decision bit to decide whether the following bit should be discarded or be a bit in 
the resulting output string. A decision rule that uses multiple bits in the original string to 
decide the output could also be applied. This would be like using the string itself as a 
template in a shrinking generator and give a greater output string (like the shrinking 
generator) without a template sting (like the self-shrinking generator). These types of 
expansion of the shrinking generators have not been examined in this thesis but it could 










 APPENDIX A. MATHEMATICAL FIELDS  
In cryptology we normally use binary numbers and finite fields. A field is defined 
as a set S of elements under the operations addition and multiplication fulfilling the 
following properties:51,52 
 
Closure If ,a b S∈ , then a b+  and a b S⋅ ∈   
Associativity If ,a b S∈  then ( ) ( )a b c a b c+ + = + +  and ( ) ( )a b c a b c⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅   
Commutativity a b b a+ = +  and a b b a⋅ = ⋅   
Identity 0a a+ =  (additive identity)  
1a a⋅ =  (multiplicative identity) 
Inverses            ( ) 0a a+ − =  (additive inverse)  
1 1a a−⋅ =  (multiplicative inverse) 
Distributivity  ( )a b c a b a c⋅ + = ⋅ + ⋅   
 
If the number of elements in the field is p (a prime) they form a field under 
addition and multiplication modulo p. In cryptology we normally use fields of order two 
( 2p = , binary), or in other words a Galois Field of degree two, ( ) ( )2GF p GF= , or 
some of their extensions (see Appendix B). 
  
51 Neal H. McCoy and Gerald J. Janusz, Introduction to Abstract Algebra (Ann Arbor, MI: 
Trustworthy Communications, 2009), 3–5.  





                                                 




 APPENDIX B. FIELD EXTENSION 
A field of order two does not give us many possibilities since it only has two 
elements. Therefore, we perform a field extension. By creating a polynomial of degree n 
using the elements of the field S as coefficients we achieve a field extension, 
( ) ( )2n nGF p GF= . 
Example: 
Using a polynomial of degree 3n =  we achieve an extension ( )32GF  of the 
binary field ( )2GF  which is represented by the polynomial 2 1 02 1 0c x c x c x+ +  where the 
coefficients nc  are in the set { }0,1S = . This polynomial now gives us the possibility to 
express eight ( 32 8= ) different polynomials: 
 
Polynomial Polynomial full 
format 
Coefficients, 
nc   
0   2 1 00 0 0x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  0 0 0 
1  2 1 00 0 1x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  0 0 1 
1 1x+ +  2 1 00 1 0x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  0 1 0 
1x +  2 1 00 1 1x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  0 1 1 
2x  2 1 01 0 0x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  1 0 0 
2 1x +  2 1 01 0 1x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  1 0 1 
2x x+  2 1 01 1 0x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  1 1 0 
2 1x x+ +  2 1 01 1 1x x x⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  1 1 1 
 
Table 3.   Polynomials and their coefficients for the extended field ( )32GF . 
A polynomial, ( )q x , is irreducible if there does not exist any other two 
polynomials, ( )p x  and ( )g x , such that ( ) ( ) ( )p x g x q x⋅ =  (all polynomials being of 
degree greater than 0). The easiest way to check that a polynomial is irreducible is to 




 ( ) ( )0 0 and 1 0f f≠ ≠   
Remember that in binary 1 1 0+ = . Looking at the polynomials presented in the 
example above, 2x x+  is not irreducible (since 21 1 0+ = ), while 2 1x x+ +  is irreducible 
(since 21 1 1 1 0+ + = ≠ ). The property of a polynomial being irreducible plays an 
important role in cryptology. In this example a polynomial of degree 3 has been used. 





 APPENDIX C. PYTHON SCRIPT FOR CONVERTING A BINARY 
FILE TO BINARY ASCII REPRESENTATION 
# This script reads and converts 100 bytes of binary data  
# and converts it to a binary ASCII string of maximum  
# length 800MB  
 
import sys, binascii 
f = open(sys.argv[1], “rb”)  # Open input file 
g = open(“result,”“w”)   # Open output file 
   
try: 
  numbytes = 0     # Set and index 
  while True: 
    bytes = f.read(100)   # Read 100 bytes 
    numbytes = numbytes + 100  # Index increment 
    if bytes == ‘‘ or numbytes > 10**8:  
      # The line above limits output to 800MB 
      break 
    x = bin(int(‘1’+binascii.hexlify(bytes),16))[3:]  
      # The line above converts to binary ASCII 
      # The ‘1’+ prevents loosing leading 0’s 
    g.write(x)     # Write to output file 
 
finally: 
  f.close()     # Close input file 










 APPENDIX D. PYTHON SCRIPT FOR APPLYING THE SELF-
SHRINKING GENERATOR TO A STRING 
# Opens a file, applies the self-shrinking generator  
# (if bit #1 is a “1” use bit #2 otherwise don’t use any of  
# them, repeat for #3 and #4, etc.) and writes the result  
# to a new file. 
 
import sys, os 
 
file = sys.argv[1] 
f = open(file)   # Open input file 
g = open(file+’mod,’”w”) # Create output file 
 
statinfo = os.stat(file) # Identify string length 
z = int(statinfo.st_size) 
 
index = 1    # Limits number of loops  
while (index  < z):  # to file length  
 
  x=f.read(1)   # Read first bit 
  index = index +1 
 
  if x==“0”:   # If bit is 0 don’t  
    y=f.read(1)  # use next bit   
    index = index +1 
  elif x==“1”:   # If bit is 0 use next bit 
    y=f.read(1) 
    index = index +1 





   else:    # For unexpected inputs 
    print “Unexpected input”  
    f.close() 
    g.close() 
    quit() 
 
f.close()    # Close input file 
g.close()    # Close output file 
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